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Abstract 
Different from the potential approach of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), we provide the dividend approach to multi-
choice games. Also, we define the level-reduced game by reducing the number of the activity levels and define related 
consistency on multi-choice games.
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     1 Introduction
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is a well-known solution concept in
cooperative game theory. A multi-choice TU game, introduced by Hsiao
and Raghavan (1992), is a generalization of a TU game in which each
player has several activity levels. There are several extensions of the
Shapley value in the framework of multi-choice games. Here we focus
one of these extensions proposed by Derks and Peters (1993), which we
name the D&P Shapley value.
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) were the ﬁrst to introduce the potential
approach to TU games. In consequence, they proved that the Shapley
value can result as the vector of marginal contributions of a potential
function. The potential approach is also shown to yield a characterization
for the Shapley value, particularly in terms of an internal consistency
property. In Section 3, we introduce the dividend approach to multi-
choice games. The dividend approach is a dual view of the potential
approach. By the dividend approach, we show that the D&P Shapley
value can result as the vector of aggregate of a dividend.
There are two important factors, the players and their activity levels,
for multi-choice games. By reducing the number of the players, Hwang
and Liao (2008) proposed an extension of the reduced game due to Hart
and Mas-Colell (1989) on multi-choice games. By reducing the number of
the activity levels, we deﬁne the level-reduced game and the level consis-
tency in Section 4. Finally, we show that the D&P Shapley value satisﬁes
the level consistency based on the dividend approach.
2 Deﬁnitions and Notations
Let U be the universe of players. Let N = {1,··· ,n} ⊆ U be a set
of players. Suppose each player i has mi ∈ N levels at which he can
actively participate. Let m = (m1,··· ,mn) be the vector that describes
the number of activity levels for each player, at which he can actively
participate. For i ∈ U, we set Mi = {0,1,··· ,mi} as the action space of
player i, where action 0 means not participating, and M
+
i = Mi \ {0}.
For N ⊆ U, N 6= ∅, let MN =
Q
i∈N Mi be the product set of the action
spaces for players N. Denote the zero vector in RN by 0N.
A multi-choice TU game is a triple (N,m,v), where N is a non-
empty and ﬁnite set of players, m is the vector that describes the number
of activity levels for each player, and v : MN → R is a characteristic
function which assigns to each action vector x = (x1,··· ,xn) ∈ MN the
worth that the players can obtain when each player i plays at activity
1level xi ∈ Mi with v(0N) = 0. If no confusion can arise a game (N,m,v)
will sometimes be denoted by its characteristic function v. Given a multi-
choice game (N,m,v) and x ∈ MN, we write (N,x,v) for the multi-
choice TU subgame obtained by restricting v to {y ∈ MN | yi ≤
xi ∀i ∈ N} only. Denote the class of all multi-choice TU games by MC.
Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC, let LN,m = {(i,j) | i ∈ N,j ∈ M
+
i }. A









Here ψi,j(N,m,v) is the power index or the value of the player i when he
takes action j to play game v. For convenience, given (N,m,v) ∈ MC
and a solution ψ on MC, we deﬁne ψi,0(N,m,v) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
To state the D&P Shapley value, some more notations will be needed.
Given S ⊆ N, let |S| be the number of elements in S and let eS(N) be






1 if i ∈ S ,
0 otherwise .
Note that if no confusion can arise eS
i (N) will be denoted by eS
i .
Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC and x ∈ MN, we deﬁne kxk =
P
k∈N xk and
S(x) = {k ∈ N | xk 6= 0}.
Let x,y ∈ RN, we say y ≤ x if yi ≤ xi for all i ∈ N. The analogue
of unanimity games for multi-choice games are minimal eﬀort games
(N,m,ux





1 if y ≥ x ;
0 otherwise.





N, where ax(v) =
P
S⊆S(x)
(−1)|S| v(x − eS).
Deﬁnition 1 (Derks and Peters, 1993) The D&P Shapley value
Θ is the solution on MC which associates with each (N,m,v) ∈ MC and









Note that the so called dividend ax(v) is divided equally among the
necessary levels.
23 Potential and Dividend
For x ∈ RN, we write xS to be the restriction of x at S for each S ⊆ N.
Let N ⊆ U, i ∈ N and x ∈ RN, for convenience we introduce the
substitution notation x−i to stand for xN\{i} and let y = (x−i,j) ∈ RN
be deﬁned by y−i = x−i and yi = j.
Given a function P : MC −→ R which associates a real number
P(N,m,v) to each game (N,m,v). Then for each (i,j) ∈ LN,m we deﬁne
D





Deﬁnition 2 A solution ψ on MC admits a potential if there exists




Solutions that admit a potential assign a scalar evaluation to each
game in such a way that a player’s payoﬀ is his marginal contribution
to this evaluation. Moreover, a function P : MC −→ R is said to be 0-
normalized if P(N,0N,v) = 0 for each N ⊆ U. And we say it is eﬃcient







Theorem 1 (Hwang and Liao, 2008) A solution ψ on MC admits
a uniquely 0-normalized and eﬃcient potential P if and only if ψ is the
D&P Shapley value Θ on MC. For all (N,m,v) ∈ MC and (i,j) ∈ LN,m,
Θi,j(N,m,v) = D
i,jP(N,m,v).
Given a function d : MC −→ R which associates a real number







Deﬁnition 3 A solution ψ on MC admits a dividend if there exists a
function d : MC → R satisﬁes for all (N,m,v) ∈ MC, N 6= ∅ and for





3Solutions that admit a dividend assign a scalar evaluation to each
game in such a way that a player’s payoﬀ is his marginal accumulation
to this evaluation. Moreover, a function d : MC −→ R is said to be 0-
normalized if d(N,0N,v) = 0 for each N ⊆ U. And we say it is eﬃcient








Theorem 2 Let ψ be a solution on MC. ψ admits a potential if and only
if ψ admits a dividend.
Proof. Assume that ψ be a solution on MC and ψ admits a dividend d.
Deﬁne P : MC −→ R to be that P(N,m,v) =
P
x∈MN d(N,x,v) for all
(N,m,v) ∈ MC. Since ψ admits the dividend d, for all (N,m,v) ∈ MC

















Hence, ψ admits the potential P.
Assume that ψ be a solution on MC and ψ admits a potential P.
Deﬁne d : MC −→ R to be that for all (N,m,v) ∈ MC, d(N,m,v) = P
T⊆S(m)(−1)|T|P(N,m − eT,v). It is easy to check that P(N,m,v) = P
x∈MN d(N,x,v). Since ψ admits the potential P, for all (N,m,v) ∈
MC and (i,j) ∈ LN,m,















Hence, ψ admits the dividend d. The proof is completed.
Theorem 3 A solution ψ on MC admits a uniquely 0-normalized and
eﬃcient dividend d if and only if ψ is the D&P Shapley value Θ on MC.





4Proof. It is easy to derive this result by Theorems 1 and 2.




for all x ∈ MN.
4 Level-reduced Game and Level Consis-
tency
In this section we deﬁne the level-reduced game and the level consis-
tency which are putting the accent on ” level ”. Based on the dividend
approach, we also show that the D&P value satisﬁes the level consistency.
By reducing the number of the players, Hwang and Liao (2008) pro-
posed an extension of the reduced game due to Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989) on multi-choice games as follows. For S ⊆ N, we denote Sc =







with respect to ψ, S and m is deﬁned
by for all x ∈ MS,
v
ψ










Deﬁnition 4 (Hwang and Liao, 2008) A solution ψ on MC satisﬁes
consistency (CON) if for all (N,m,v) ∈ MC, for all S ⊆ N and for







Theorem 4 (Hwang and Liao, 2008) The solution Θ satisﬁes CON.
Inspired by Hsiao, Yeh and Mo (1994), we deﬁne an alternative level-
reduced game and related consistency as follows. Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC




i = mi if zi < mi
z∗
i = 0 if zi = mi.
Furthermore, we deﬁne a new game vψ
z with z ∈ MN \ {0N} such that
for all y ≤ z,
v
ψ








where (y ∨ z∗)i = max{yi,z∗
i} for all i ∈ N. We call (N,z,vψ
z ) a level-
reduced game of v with respect to z and the solution ψ.
5Deﬁnition 5 A solution ψ on MC satisﬁes level consistency (LCON)
if for all i ∈ N \ S(z∗) and for all j ≤ zi, ψi,j(N,m,v) = ψi,j(N,z,vψ
z ).
Remark 2 Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC, S ⊆ N and a solution ψ. Let z =




z (y) = v
ψ
S,m(y) for all y ≤ z.
Hence, if a solution ψ satisﬁes LCON, then ψ satisﬁes CON.
It is known that each (N,m,v) ∈ MC can be expressed as a lin-
ear combination of minimal eﬀort games and this decomposition ex-
ists uniquely. The following lemma relates the relation of coeﬃcients
of expressions between a (N,m,v) ∈ MC and its level-reduced game
(N,z,vΘ
z ) with respect to Θ and z.
Lemma 1 Let (N,m,v) ∈ MC and (N,z,vΘ
z ) be the level-reduced game
of (N,m,v) with respect to Θ and z ∈ MN \ {0N}. Obviously, z can be












z ) · u
y









k(yS,0Sc)k+k(t,0S)ka(yS,t)(v) if y = (yS,0Sc) ,
0 if y = (yS,ySc) with |S(ySc,0S)| 6= 0.
Proof. Let (N,m,v) ∈ MC and z ∈ MN \ {0N}. Obviously, z =
(mS,zSc) for some S ⊆ N where zi 6= mi for all i ∈ Sc. For any y ≤ z,
v
Θ













z (y) = 0 if y = 0N. Since z∗ = (0S,mSc),
































































6By deﬁnition of vΘ
z , for any y ≤ z,
v
Θ











k(yS,0Sc)k+k(t,0S)ka(yS,t)(v) if y = (yS,0Sc) ,
0 if y = (yS,ySc) with |S(ySc,0S)| 6= 0.
























z ) · u
y
N.
Theorem 5 The solution Θ satisﬁes LCON.
Proof. Let (N,m,v) ∈ MC and z ∈ MN \ {0N}. Obviously, z =
(mS,zSc) for some S ⊆ N where zi 6= mi for all i ∈ Sc. For all i ∈

































Hence the solution Θ satisﬁes LCON.
Remark 3 Hwang and Liao (2008) characterized the D&P value by
means of consistency. By Remark 2 and Theorem 5, it’s easy to check
that consistency could be replaced by level-consistency in those axiomati-
zations.
In fact, as some axioms are alterd to ﬁt solutions form focusing
on ”dividend”, the executions for characterizations among solutions on
multi-choice games are similar. The dividend forms not only oﬀer inter-
pretations for solutions but also provide motivations for axioms of solu-
tions.
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